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Abstract
We consider Pareto optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of ap-
plicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over
individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this is the
most general setting examined so far in the literature, our work unifies and generalizes
several known results. Specifically, we characterize POMs and introduce the Gener-
alized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT) that effectively handles ties
via properties of network flows. We show that GSDT can generate all POMs using
different priority orderings over the applicants, but it satisfies truthfulness only for
certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our mechanism; we show
that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is prone to strategic manip-
ulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case (with or without ties), for which
truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do exist.
Keywords: Pareto optimality, many-to-many matching, serial dictatorship, truthfulness
1 Introduction
We study a many-to-many matching market that involves two finite disjoint sets, a set
of applicants and a set of courses. Each applicant finds a subset of courses acceptable
and has a preference ordering, not necessarily strict, over these courses. Courses do not
have preferences. Moreover, each applicant has a quota on the number of courses she can
attend, while each course has a quota on the number of applicants it can admit.
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A matching is a set of applicant-course pairs such that each applicant is paired only
with acceptable courses and the quotas associated with the applicants and the courses
are respected. The problem of finding an “optimal” matching given the above market
is called the Course Allocation problem (CA). Although various optimality criteria exist,
Pareto optimality (or Pareto efficiency) remains the most popular one (see, e.g., [1, 2, 9,
8, 19]). Pareto optimality is a fundamental concept that economists regard as a minimal
requirement for a “reasonable” outcome of a mechanism. A matching is a Pareto optimal
matching (POM) if there is no other matching in which no applicant is worse off and
at least one applicant is better off. Our work examines Pareto optimal many-to-many
matchings in the setting where applicants’ preferences may include ties.
In the special case where each applicant and course has quota equal to one, our setting
reduces to the extensively studied House Allocation problem (HA) [15, 1, 21], also known
as the Assignment problem [12, 4]. Computational aspects of HA have been examined
thoroughly [2, 18] and particularly for the case where applicants’ preferences are strict.
In [2] the authors provide a characterization of POMs in the case of strict preferences
and utilize it in order to construct polynomial-time algorithms for checking whether a
given matching is a POM and for finding a POM of maximum size. They also show
that any POM in an instance of HA with strict preferences can be obtained through the
well-known Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (SDM) [1]. SDM is a straightforward greedy
algorithm that allocates houses sequentially according to some exogenous priority ordering
of the applicants.
Recently, the above results have been extended in two different directions. The first one
[17] considers HA in settings where preferences may include ties. Prior to [17], few works in
the literature had considered extensions of SDM to such settings. The difficulty regarding
ties, observed already in [20], is that the assignments made in the individual steps of the
SDM are not unique, and an unsuitable choice may result in an assignment that violates
Pareto optimality. In [5] and [20] an implicit extension of SDM is provided (in the former
case for dichotomous preferences, where an applicant’s preference list comprises a single
tie containing all acceptable houses), but without an explicit description of an algorithmic
procedure. Krysta et al. [17] describe a mechanism called the Serial Dictatorship Mecha-
nism with Ties (SDMT) that combines SDM with the use of augmenting paths to ensure
Pareto optimality. SDMT includes an augmentation step, in which applicants already
assigned a house may exchange it for another, equally preferred one, to enable another
applicant to take a house that is most preferred given the assignments made so far. They
also show that any POM in an instance of HA with ties can be obtained by an execution
of SDMT and also provide the so-called Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties
(RSDMT) whose (expected) approximation ratio is ee−1 with respect to the maximum-size
POM.
The second direction [8] extends the results of [2] to the many-to-many setting (i.e.,
CA) with strict preferences, while also allowing for a structure of applicant-wise acceptable
sets that is more general than the one implied by quotas. Namely, [8] assumes that each
applicant selects from a family of course subsets that is downward closed with respect to
inclusion. This work provides a characterization of POMs assuming that the preferences of
applicants over sets of courses are obtained from their (strict) preferences over individual
courses in a lexicographic manner. Using this characterization, it is shown that deciding
whether a given matching is a POM can be accomplished in polynomial time. In addition,
[8] generalizes SDM to provide the Generalized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (GSD),
which can be used to obtain any POM for CA under strict preferences. The main idea
of GSD is to allow each applicant to choose not her most preferred set of courses at once
but, instead, only one course at a time (i.e., the most preferred among non-full courses
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that can be added to the courses already chosen). This result is important as the version
of SDM where an applicant chooses immediately her most preferred set of courses cannot
obtain all POMs.
Our contribution. In the current work, we combine the directions appearing in [17]
and [8] to explore the many-to-many setting in which applicants have preferences, which
may include ties, over individual courses. We extend these preferences to sets of courses
lexicographically, since lexicographic set preferences naturally describe human behavior
[13], they have already been considered in models of exchange of indivisible goods [8, 11]
and also possess theoretically interesting properties including responsiveness [16].
We provide a characterization of POMs in this setting, leading to a polynomial-time
algorithm for testing whether a given matching is Pareto optimal. We introduce the Gen-
eralized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT) that generalizes both SDMT
and GSD. SDM assumes a priority ordering over the applicants, according to which ap-
plicants are served one by one by the mechanism. Since in our setting applicants can be
assigned more than one course, each applicant can return to the ordering several times
(up to her quota), each time choosing just one course. The idea of using augmenting
paths [17] has to be employed carefully to ensure that during course shuffling no applicant
replaces a previously assigned course for a less preferred one. To achieve this, we utilize
methods and properties of network flows. Although we prove that GSDT can generate
all POMs using different priority orderings over applicants, we also observe that some of
the priority orderings guarantee truthfulness whereas some others do not. That is, there
may exist priority orderings for which some applicant benefits from misrepresenting her
preferences. This is in contrast to SDM and SDMT in the one-to-one case in the sense
that all executions of these mechanisms induce truthfulness. This shortcoming however
is not specific to our mechanism, since we establish that any mechanism generating all
POMs is prone to strategic manipulation by one or more applicants.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we define our notation and terminology.
The characterization is provided in Section 3, while GSDT is presented in Section 4. A
discussion on applicants’ incentives in GSDT is provided in Section 5. Avenues for future
research are discussed in Section 6.
applicant quota preference list course quota
a1 2 ({c1, c2}, {c3}, ∅) c1 2
a2 3 ({c2}, {c1, c3}, ∅) c2 1
a3 2 ({c3}, {c2}, {c1}) c3 1
Table 1: An instance I of ca.
2 Preliminary definitions of notation and terminology
Let A = {a1, a2, · · · , an1} be the set of applicants, C = {c1, c2, · · · , cn2} the set of courses
and [i] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , i}. Each applicant a has a quota b(a) that denotes the
maximum number of courses a can accommodate into her schedule, and likewise each
course c has a quota q(c) that denotes the maximum number of applicants it can admit.
Each applicant finds a subset of courses acceptable and has a transitive and complete
preference ordering, not necessarily strict, over these courses. We write c a c′ to denote
that applicant a (strictly) prefers course c to course c′, and c 'a c′ to denote that a is
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indifferent between c and c′. We write c a c′ to denote that a either prefers c to c′ or is
indifferent between them, and say that a weakly prefers c to c′.
Because of indifference, each applicant divides her acceptable courses into indifference
classes such that she is indifferent between the courses in the same class and has a strict
preference over courses in different classes. Let Cat denote the t’th indifference class, or
tie, of applicant a where t ∈ [n2]. The preference list of any applicant a is the tuple of sets
Cat , i.e., P (a) = (C
a
1 , C
a
2 , · · · , Can2); we assume that Cat = ∅ implies Cat′ = ∅ for all t′ > t.
Occasionally we consider P (a) to be a set itself and write c ∈ P (a) instead of c ∈ Cat
for some t. We denote by P the joint preference profile of all applicants, and by P(−a)
the joint profile of all applicants except a. Under these definitions, an instance of CA is
denoted by I = (A,C,P, b, q). Such an instance appears in Table 1.
A (many-to-many) assignment µ is a subset of A × C. For a ∈ A, µ(a) = {c ∈ C :
(a, c) ∈ µ} and for c ∈ C, µ(c) = {a ∈ A : (a, c) ∈ µ}. An assignment µ is a matching
if µ(a) ⊆ P (a)—and thus µ is individually rational, |µ(a)| ≤ b(a) for each a ∈ A and
|µ(c)| ≤ q(c) for each c ∈ C. We say that a is exposed if |µ(a)| < b(a), and is full
otherwise. Analogous definitions of exposed and full hold for courses.
For an applicant a and a set of courses S, we define the generalized characteristic vector
χa(S) as the vector (|S ∩ Ca1 |, |S ∩ Ca2 |, . . . , |S ∩ Can2 |). We assume that for any two sets
of courses S and U , a prefers S to U if and only if χa(S) >lex χa(U), i.e., if and only if
there is an indifference class Cat such that |S ∩ Cat | > |U ∩ Cat | and |S ∩ Cat′ | = |U ∩ Cat′ |
for all t′ < t. If a neither prefers S to U nor U to S, then she is indifferent between S and
U . We write SaU if a prefers S to U , S 'a U if a is indifferent between S and U , and
S a U if a weakly prefers S to U .
A matching µ is a Pareto optimal matching (POM) if there is no other matching in
which some applicant is better off and none is worse off. Formally, µ is Pareto optimal if
there is no matching µ′ such that µ′(a) a µ(a) for all a ∈ A, and µ′(a′)a′µ(a′) for some
a′ ∈ A. If such a µ′ exists, we say that µ′ Pareto dominates µ.
A deterministic mechanism φ maps an instance to a matching, i.e. φ : I 7→ µ where I is
a CA instance and µ is a matching in I. A randomized mechanism φ maps an instance to a
distribution over possible matchings. Applicants’ preferences are private knowledge and an
applicant may prefer not to reveal her preferences truthfully. A deterministic mechanism
is dominant strategy truthful (or just truthful) if all applicants always find it best to declare
their true preferences, no matter what other applicants declare. Formally speaking, for
every applicant a and every possible declared preference list P ′(a), φ(P (a),P(−a)) a
φ(P ′(a),P(−a)), for all P (a),P(−a). A randomized mechanism φ is universally truthful
if it is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
3 Characterizing Pareto optimal matchings
Manlove [18, Sec. 6.2.2.1] provided a characterization of Pareto optimal matchings in
HA with preferences that may include indifference. He defined three different types of
coalitions with respect to a given matching such that the existence of either means that
a subset of applicants can trade among themselves (possibly using some exposed course)
ensuring that, at the end, no one is worse off and at least one applicant is better off.
He also showed that if no such coalition exists, then the matching is guaranteed to be
Pareto optimal. We show that this characterization extends to the many-to-many setting,
although the proof is more complex and involved than in the one-to-one setting. We then
utilize the characterization in designing a polynomial-time algorithm for testing whether
a given matching is Pareto optimal.
In what follows we assume that in each sequence C no applicant or course appears
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more than once.
An alternating path coalition w.r.t. µ comprises a sequence C = 〈cj0 , ai0 , cj1 ,
ai1 , . . . , cjr−1 , air−1 , cjr〉 where r ≥ 1, cjk ∈ µ(aik) (0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1), cjk 6∈ µ(aik−1)
(1 ≤ k ≤ r), ai0 is full, and cjr is an exposed course. Furthermore, ai0 prefers cj1 to
cj0 and, if r ≥ 2, aik weakly prefers cjk+1 to cjk (1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1).
An augmenting path coalition w.r.t. µ comprises a sequence C = 〈ai0 , cj1 , ai1 ,
. . . , cjr−1 , air−1 , cjr〉 where r ≥ 1, cjk ∈ µ(aik) (1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1), cjk 6∈ µ(aik−1) (1 ≤ k ≤ r),
ai0 is an exposed applicant, and cjr is an exposed course. Furthermore, ai0 finds cj1
acceptable and, if r ≥ 2, aik weakly prefers cjk+1 to cjk (1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1).
A cyclic coalition w.r.t. µ comprises a sequence C = 〈cj0 , ai0 , cj1 , ai1 , . . . , cjr−1 ,
air−1〉 where r ≥ 2, cjk ∈ µ(aik) (0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1), and cjk 6∈ µ(aik−1) (1 ≤ k ≤ r).
Furthermore, ai0 prefers cj1 to cj0 and aik weakly prefers cjk+1 to cjk (1 ≤ k ≤ r− 1). (All
subscripts are taken modulo r when reasoning about cyclic coalitions).
We define an improving coalition to be an alternating path coalition, an augmenting
path coalition or a cyclic coalition.
Given an improving coalition C, the matching
µC = (µ \ {(aik , cjk) : δ ≤ k ≤ r − 1}) ∪ {(aik , cjk+1) : 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1}} (1)
is defined to be the matching obtained from µ by satisfying C (δ = 1 in the case that C is
an augmenting path coalition, otherwise δ = 0).
We will soon show that improving coalitions are at the heart of characterizing Pareto
optimal matchings (Theorem 2). The next lemma will come in handy in the proof of
Theorem 2 and Theorem 10. We say that a sequence of applicants and courses is a
pseudocoalition if it satisfies all conditions of an improving coalition except that some
courses or applicants may appear more that once.
Lemma 1. Let a matching µ in an instance I of CA admit a pseudocoalition K of length
` for some finite `. Then µ admits an improving coalition C of length at most `.
Proof. We prove this by induction. Obviously ` ≥ 2. For the base case, it is easy to see
that K itself is an augmenting path coalition (where r = 1) if ` = 2 , an alternating path
coalition (where r = 1) if ` = 3, a cyclic coalition (where r = 2) if ` = 4 and K ends
with an applicant, and an augmenting path coalition (where r = 2) if ` = 4 and K ends
with a course. Assume that the claim holds for all pseudocoalitions of length d, d < `.
We show that it also holds for any given pseudocoalition K of length `. In the rest of the
proof we show that either K is in fact an improving coalition, or we can derive a shorter
pseudocoalition K ′ from K, hence completing the proof.
The case for a repeated course: Assume that a course c appears more than once
in K. We consider two different scenarios.
1. If c is not the very first element of K, then sequence K is in the following form where
where c = cjx = cjy .
. . . , aix−1 ,
←−−−−−→cjx , aix , . . ., cjy , . . .
In this case, we simply delete the portion of K under the arrow. Note that in the
new sequence cjy appears right after after aix−1 , but then cjy = cjx . Hence we have
obtained a shorter sequence, and it is easy to verify that this new sequence is a
pseudocoalition.
2. If c is the first element of K, then K is in the following form where c = cj0 = cjy .
←−−−−−−−−−−→cj0 , ai0 , . . . , aiy−1 , cjy , . . .
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In this case, we simply only keep the portion of K under the arrow, i.e. our new
sequence starts with cj0 and ends with aiy−1 . The new sequence is shorter and it is
easy to verify that it is a pseudocoalition.
The case for a repeated applicant: Assume that an applicant a appears more than
once in K. We consider the three different possible scenarios.
1. If a is not the very first element of K, nor the last one, then K is in the following
form where a = aix = aiy .
. . . , cjx ,
←−−−−−−−−−−−−→aix , cjx+1 , . . . , aiy−1 , ciy , aiy , cjy+1 , . . .
Note that cjx+1 aix cjx and cjy+1 aix cjy (since aix = ajy). We consider two
different cases.
(a) If cjx+1aix cjy , then we simply only keep the portion of K under the arrow and
add cjy to the beginning. That is, the new sequence is K
′ = 〈cjy , aix , cjx+1 ,
. . . , aiy−1〉. K ′ is shorter than K and it is easy to verify that that it is a
pseudocoalition.
(b) If cjy aix cjx+1 , then cjy+1 aix cjx . Then we simply remove the portion of K
from cjx+1 up to aiy . That is, the new sequence is K
′ = 〈. . . cjx , aix , cjy+1 . . .〉
which is shorter than K. Note that if either cjx+1aix cjx or cjy+1aix cjy , then
cjy+1aix cjx . Hence it is easy to verify that K ′ is a pseudocoalition.
2. If a is the first element of K but not the last one, then K is in the following form
where a = ai0 = aiy .
ai0 ,
←−−−−−−−−−→cj1 , . . . , cjy , aiy , cjy+1 , . . .
Notice that a0 is exposed and finds cjy+1 acceptable and is not matched to it
under µ. Hence we simply remove the portion of K under the arrow and get
K ′ = 〈ai0 , cjy+1 , . . .〉. K ′ is shorter than K and it is easy to verify that it is a
pseudocoalition.
3. If a is the last element of K but not the first one, then K is of the following form
where a = aix = aiy .
cj0 , . . . , cjx ,
←−−−−−−−−−−−−→aix , cjx+1 , . . . , aiy−1 , cjy , aiy
Note that, as aix = aiy , cjx+1 aix cjx and cj0 aix cjy . Furthermore, aix is not
matched to cj0 in µ. We consider two different cases.
(a) If cjx+1aix cjy , then we do as we did in Case 1(a). That is, we only keep the
portion of K under the arrow and add cjy to the beginning; the new sequence
is K ′ = 〈cjy , aix , cjx+1 , . . . , aiy−1〉. K ′ is shorter than K and it is easy to verify
that it is a pseudocoalition.
(b) If cjy aix cjx+1 , then cj0 aix cjx+1 aix cjx . Then we simply remove the
portion of K from cjx+1 until the end of the sequence. That is, the new sequence
is K ′ = 〈cj0 , . . . , cjx , aix〉. K ′ is shorter than K and it is easy to verify that it
is a pseudocoalition.
Note that we do not need to check the case where K starts and ends with an applicant,
since then K would not fit the definition of an improving coalition.
The following theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a matching to be
Pareto optimal.
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Theorem 2. Given a CA instance I, a matching µ is a Pareto optimal matching in I if
and only if µ admits no improving coalition.
Proof. Let µ be a Pareto optimal matching in I. Assume to the contrary that µ admits an
improving coalition C. It is fairly easy to see that matching µC obtained from µ according
to equation (1) Pareto dominates µ, a contradiction.
Conversely, let µ be a matching in I that admits no improving coalition, and suppose
to the contrary that it is not Pareto optimal. Therefore, there exists some matching
µ′ 6= µ such that µ′ Pareto dominates µ. Let Gµ,µ′ = µ⊕µ′ be the graph representing the
symmetric difference of µ and µ′. Gµ,µ′ is hence a bipartite graph with applicants in one
side and courses in the other; by abusing notation, we may use a or c to refer to a node in
Gµ,µ′ corresponding to applicant a ∈ A or course c ∈ C, respectively. Note that each edge
of Gµ,µ′ either belongs to µ, referred to as a µ-edge, or to µ
′, referred to as a µ′-edge.
We first provide an intuitive sketch of the rest of the proof. Our goal is to find an
improving coalition, hence contradicting the assumption that µ does not admit one. We
start with an applicant ai0 who strictly prefers µ
′ to µ. We choose a µ′-edge (ai0 , cj1) such
that cj1 belongs to the first indifference class where µ
′ is better than µ for ai0 . Either
this edge already represents an improving coalition—which is the case if cj1 is exposed in
µ—or there exists a µ-edge incident to cj1 . In this fashion, we continue by adding edges
that alternatively belong to µ′ (when we are at an applicant node) and µ (when we are
at a course node), never passing the same edge twice (by simple book-keeping). Most
importantly, we always make sure that when we are at an applicant node, we choose a
µ′-edge such that the applicant weakly prefers the course incident to the µ′-edge to the
course incident to the precedent µ-edge. We argue that ultimately we either reach an
exposed course (which implies that an augmenting or an alternating path coalition exists
in µ) or are able to identify a cyclic coalition in µ.
Let us first provide some definitions and facts. Let A′ be the set of applicants who prefer
µ′ to µ; i.e., A′ = {a|µ′(a)aµ(a)}. Moreover, for each a ∈ A, let µ′\µ(a) = µ′(a) \ µ(a)
and µ\µ′(a) = µ(a) \ µ′(a). Likewise, for each course c ∈ C, let µ\µ′(c) = µ(c) \ µ′(c)
and µ′\µ(c) = µ
′(c) \ µ(c). Note that these sets will be altered during the course of the
proof. In what follows and in order to simplify presentation, we will say that we remove
a µ′-edge (a, c) from Gµ,µ′ to signify that we remove c from µ′\µ(a) and remove a from
µ′\µ(c); similarly, we say that we remove a µ-edge (a, c) from Gµ,µ′ to signify that we
remove c from µ\µ′(a) and remove a from µ\µ′(c). The facts described below follow from
the definitions and the assumption that µ′ Pareto dominates µ. Let Υ be a set containing
applicants (initially, Υ = ∅); we will explain later what this set will come to contain.
Fact 1: For every course c that is full under µ, it is the case that |µ\µ′(c)| ≥ |µ′\µ(c)|.
Fact 2: For every applicant a ∈ A′ \ Υ, there exists `∗a ≤ n2 such that |Ca` ∩ µ′\µ(a)| =
|Ca` ∩ µ\µ′(a)| for all ` < `∗a, and |Ca`∗a ∩ µ′\µ(a)| > |Ca`∗a ∩ µ\µ′(a)|. Hence, Ca`∗a denotes the
first indifference class of a in which µ′ is better than µ for a.
Fact 3: For every applicant a ∈ A′ that is full in µ, there exists `+, `∗a < `+ ≤ n2, such
that |Ca`+ ∩ µ\µ′(a)| > |Ca`+ ∩ µ′\µ(a)|.
In what follows, we iteratively remove edges from Gµ,µ′ (so as not to visit an edge
twice and maintain the aformentioned facts) and create a corresponding path C, which we
show that in all possible cases implies an improving coalition in µ, thus contradicting our
assumption.
As µ′ Pareto dominates µ, A′ is nonempty. Let ai0 be an applicant in A′. By Fact 2,
there exists a course cj1 ∈ C`∗ai0 ∩ µ
′
\µ(ai0). Hence, we remove edge (ai0 , cj1) from Gµ,µ′
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and add it to C, i.e., C = 〈ai0 , cj1〉. If cj1 is exposed, then an augmenting path coalition is
implied. More specifically, if ai0 is also exposed in µ, then C = 〈ai0 , cj1〉 is an augmenting
path coalition. Otherwise, if ai0 is full in µ, then it follows from Fact 3 that there exists a
course cj0 ∈ µ\µ′(ai0) such that cj1ai0 cj0 . Then C = 〈ci0 , ai0 , cj1〉 is an alternating path
coalition.
If, on the other hand, cj1 is full, we continue our search for an improving coalition in
an iterative manner (as follows) until we either reach an exposed course (in which case
we show that an augmenting or alternating coalition is found) or revisit an applicant
that belongs to A′ (in which case we show that a cyclic coalition is found). Note that
ai0 ∈ µ′\µ(cj1), hence it follows from Fact 1 that |µ\µ′(cj1)| ≥ 1. At the start of each
iteration k ≥ 1, we have:
C = 〈ai0 , cj1 , . . . , aik−1 , cjk〉
such that by the construction of C (through the iterative procedure) every applicant aix
on C weakly prefers the course that follows her on C— i.e., cjx+1 to which she is matched
to in µ′ but not in µ—to the course that precedes her—i.e., cjx to which she is matched to
in µ but not in µ′. Moreover, ai0 is either exposed and can accommodate one more course,
namely cj1 , or is full and hence there exists a course cj0 ∈ µ\µ′(ai0) such that ai0 strictly
prefers cj1 to cj0 . Notice that C would imply an improving coalition (using Lemma 1) if
cjk is exposed.
During the iterative procedure, set Υ includes those applicants who strictly prefer the
course they are given in C under µ′ than under µ. That is, Υ = {aik ∈ C : cjk+1 aik
cjk} ∪ {ai0}. Note that applicant ai0 is also included in Υ, since either she is exposed, or
∃cj0 ∈ µ\µ′(ai0) such that cj1ai0 cj0 .
The Iterative Procedure: We repeat the following procedure until either the last course
on C, cjk , is exposed or Case 3 is reached. If cjk is full, then by Fact 1 there must exist an
applicant aik ∈ µ\µ′(cik); note that aik 6= aik−1 . Remove (aik , cjk) from Gµ,µ′ . Let C
aik
` be
the indifference class of aik to which cjk belongs. We consider three different cases.
• Case 1: |Caik` ∩ µ′\µ(aik)| ≥ |Caik` ∩ µ\µ′(aik)|. Then there must exist a course
cjk+1 ∈ C
aik
` ∩ µ′\µ(aik); note that cjk 6= cjk+1 . Hence, we remove (aik , cjk+1) from
Gµ,µ′ and append 〈aik , cjk+1〉 to C.
• Case 2: |Caik` ∩ µ′\µ(aik)| < |Caik` ∩ µ\µ′(aik)| and aik /∈ Υ. Recall that µ′ Pareto
dominates µ, hence it must be that aik ∈ A′. Therefore if follows from Fact 2 that
`∗aik < ` and there exists a course cjk+1 ∈ C
aik
`∗aik
∩ µ′\µ(aik); note that cjk 6= cjk+1 .
Hence, we remove (aik , cjk+1) from Gµ,µ′ and append 〈aik , cjk+1〉 to C. Moreover, we
add aik to Υ.
• Case 3: |Caik` ∩ µ′\µ(aik)| < |Caik` ∩ µ\µ′(aik)| and aik ∈ Υ; note that this case
cannot happen when k = 1. Let aiz be the first occurrence of aik which has resulted
in aik being added to Υ; i.e., 0 ≤ z < k and aiz = aik . Therefore, C is of the form
〈ai0 , cj1 , ai1 , . . . , aiz , cjz+1 , . . . aik−1 , cjk〉. Let us consider C = 〈cjk , aiz , cjz+1 , . . . aik−1〉.
Since aiz = aik ∈ Υ, aiz ∈ A′ and, by the construction of C, cjz+1 ∈ Cik`∗ik , it follows
from Fact 2 that `∗aiz < `, which implies (using the assumption of Case 3) that
cjz+1izcjk .
If at any iteration k we find a cjk that is exposed in µ or we arrive at Case 3, then an
improving coalition is implied (using Lemma 1), which contradicts our assumption on µ.
Otherwise (cases 1 and 2), we continue with a new iteration. However, since the number
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of edges is bounded, this iterative procedure is bound to terminate, either by reaching an
exposed course or by reaching Case 3.
It follows from Theorem 2 that in order to test whether a given matching µ is Pareto
optimal, it is sufficient to check whether it does not admit any improving coalition. To
check this, we construct the extended envy graph associated with µ.
Definition 1. The extended envy graph G(µ) = (VG(µ), EG(µ)) associated with a matching
µ is a weighted digraph with VG(µ) = VA∪VC∪Vµ, where VC = {c : c ∈ C}, VA = {a : a ∈ A}
and Vµ = {ac : (a, c) ∈ µ}, and EG(µ) = E1G(µ) ∪ E2G(µ) ∪ E3G(µ) where:
• E1G(µ) = {(c, a) : a ∈ A, c ∈ C, and |µ(c)| < q(c)}
⋃{(c, ac′) : c ∈ C and |µ(c)| <
q(c)}, with weight equal to 0;
• E2G(µ) = {(a, c) : a ∈ A, c ∈ P (a)\µ(a) and |µ(a)| < b(a)}
⋃{(a, a′c) : a ∈ A\{a′}, c ∈
P (a) \ µ(a) and |µ(a)| < b(a)}, with weight equal to −1; and
• E3G(µ) = {(ac, c′) : c′ ∈ P (a) \ µ(a) and c′ a c}
⋃{(ac, a′c′) : c′ ∈ P (a) \ µ(a) and
c′ a c}, with weight equal to 0 if c′ 'a c or −1 if c′ a c.
That is, G(µ) includes one node per course, one node per applicant and one node per
applicant-course pair that participates in µ. With respect to EG(µ), a ‘0’ (‘−1’) arc is
an arc with weight 0 (−1). There is a ‘0’ arc leaving from each exposed course node to
any other (non-course) node in G(µ) (arcs in E1G(µ)). Moreover, there is a −1 arc leaving
each exposed applicant node a towards any course node or applicant-course node whose
corresponding course is in P (a) \ µ(a) (arcs in E2G(µ)). Finally, there is an arc leaving
each applicant-course node ac towards any course node or applicant-course node whose
corresponding course c′ is not in µ(a) and c′ a c. The weight of such an arc is 0 if c′ 'a c
or −1 if c′ a c (arcs in E3G(µ)).
The following theorem establishes the connection between Pareto optimality of a given
matching and the absence of negative cost cycles in the extended envy graph corresponding
to that matching.
Theorem 3. A matching µ is Pareto optimal if and only if its extended envy graph G(µ)
has no negative cost cycles.
Proof. First we show that if G(µ) has no negative cost cycle, then µ is Pareto opti-
mal. Assume for a contradiction that µ is not Pareto optimal; this means that there
exists an improving coalition C. We examine each of the three different types of im-
proving coalition separately. Assume that C is an alternating path coalition, i.e., C =
〈cj0 , ai0 , cj1 , ai1 , . . . , cjr−1air−1 , cjr〉 where r ≥ 1, (aik , cjk) ∈ µ (0 ≤ k ≤ r−1), (aik−1 , cjk) 6∈
µ (1 ≤ k ≤ r), ai0 is full, and cjr is an exposed course. Furthermore, cj1 ai0 cj0 and,
if r ≥ 2, cjk+1 aik cjk (1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1). By Definition 1, there exists in G(µ) an arc
(aikcjk , aik+1cjk+1) for each 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 2, an arc (air−1cjr−1 , cjr), and an arc (cjr , ai0cj0),
thus creating a cycle K in G(µ). Since all arcs of K have weight 0 or −1 and (ai0cj0 , ai1cj1)
has weight −1 (because cj1 ai0 cj0), K is a negative cost cycle, a contradiction. A similar
argument can be used for the case where C is an augmenting path coalition; our reasoning
on the implied cycle would start with a ‘−1’ arc (ai0 , ai1cj1) and would conclude with a
‘0’ arc (cjr , ai0). Finally, for a cyclic coalition C, the implied negative cost cycle includes
all arcs (aikcjk , aik+1cjk+1) for 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1 taken modulo r, where at least one arc has
weight −1 (otherwise, C would not be a cyclic coalition). In all cases, the existence of an
improving coalition implies a negative cost cycle in G(µ), a contradiction.
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Next, we show that if µ is Pareto optimal, G(µ) has no negative cost cycles. We
prove this via contradiction. Let µ be a POM, and assume that G(µ) has a negative cost
cycle. Given that there exists a negative cost cycle in G(µ), there must also exist one that
is simple and of minimal length. Hence, without loss of generality, let K be a minimal
(length) simple negative cost cycle in G(µ). We commence by considering that K contains
only nodes in Vµ. We create a sequence K corresponding to K as follows. Starting from
an applicant-course node of K with an outgoing ’−1’ arc, say ai0cj0 , we first place cj0 in
K followed by ai0 , and continue by repeating this process for all nodes in K. It is then
easy to verify, by Definition 1 and the definition of a cyclic coalition, that K corresponds
to a sequence K = 〈cj0 , ai0 , . . . , cjr−1 , air−1〉 that satisfies all conditions of a cyclic coalition
with the exception that some courses or applicants may appear more than once. But this
means that, by Lemma 1, µ admits an improving coalition, which contradicts that µ is a
POM.
To conclude the proof, we consider the case where K includes at least one node from
VA or VC . Note that if K contains a node from VA, then it also contains a node from VC .
This is because, by Definition 1, the only incoming arcs to an applicant node are of type
E1G(µ). Therefore K includes at least one course node. We now claim that since K is of
minimal length, it will contain only one course node. Assume for a contradiction that K
contains more than one course nodes. Since K is a negative cost cycle, it contains at least
one ‘−1’ arc which leaves an applicant node a (or an applicant-course node ac′). Let c be
the first course node in K that appears after this ‘−1’ arc. Recall that for c to be in K, c is
exposed in µ and there exists a ‘0’ arc from c to any applicant or applicant-course node of
G(µ). Hence, there also exists such an arc from c to a (or to ac′), thus forming a negative
cost cycle smaller than K, a contradiction. Note that this also implies that K contains at
most one node in VA. This is because, by Definition 1, the only incoming arcs to nodes
in VA are from nodes in VC , therefore the claim follows from the facts that c is the only
course node in K, and K is a simple cycle. We create a sequence K corresponding to K as
follows. If K contains an applicant node a, we start K with a. If K contains a course node
c, we end K with c. Any applicant-course node a′c′ is handled by placing c′ first and then
a′. It is now easy to verify, by Definition 1 and the definition of a cyclic coalition, that K
corresponds to a sequence K = 〈ai0 , cj1 , ai1 , . . . , cjr−1 , air−1 , cjr〉 (if K contains an applicant
node) or a sequence K = 〈cj0 , ai0 , . . . , cjr−1 , air−1 , cjr〉 (if K contains no applicant node),
such that K satisfies all conditions of either an augmenting path coalition (if K contains
an applicant node) or an alternating path coalition (if K contains no applicant node),
with the exception that some courses or applicants may appear more than once. But this
means that, by Lemma 1, µ admits an augmenting path coalition (or an alternating path
coalition), which contradicts that µ is a POM.
Theorem 3 implies that to test whether a matching µ is Pareto optimal or not, it
suffices to create the corresponding extended envy graph and check whether it contains
a negative cost cycle. It is easy to see that we can create G(µ) in polynomial time. To
test whether G(µ) admits a negative cycle, we can make use of various algorithms that
exist in the literature (see [10] for a survey), e.g. Moore-Bellman-Ford which terminates
in O(|VG(µ)||EG(µ)|) time. However, as all arcs in G(µ) are of costs either 0 or −1 and
hence integer, we can use a faster algorithm of [14] which, for our setting, terminates in
O(
√
|VG(µ)||EG(µ)|) time.
Corollary 4. Given a CA instance I and a matching µ, we can check in polynomial time
whether µ is Pareto optimal in I.
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4 Constructing Pareto optimal matchings
We propose an algorithm for finding a POM in an instance of CA, which is in a certain
sense a generalization of Serial Dictatorship thus named Generalized Serial Dictatorship
Mechanism with ties (GSDT). The algorithm starts by setting the quotas of all appli-
cants to 0 and those of courses at the original values given by q. At each stage i, the
algorithm selects a single applicant whose original capacity has not been reached, and
increases only her capacity by 1. The algorithm terminates after B =
∑
a∈A b(a) stages,
i.e., once the original capacities of all applicants have been reached. In that respect, the
algorithm assumes a ‘multisequence’ Σ = (a1, a2, . . . , aB) of applicants such that each
applicant a appears b(a) times in Σ; e.g., for the instance of Table 1 and the sequence
Σ = (a1, a1, a2, a2, a3, a2, a3), the vector of capacities evolves as follows:
(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (2, 1, 0), (2, 2, 0), (2, 2, 1), (2, 3, 1), (2, 3, 2).
Let us denote the vector of applicants’ capacities in stage i by bi, i.e., b0 is the all-
zeroes vector and bB = b. Clearly, each stage corresponds to an instance Ii similar to
the original instance except for the capacities vector bi. At each stage i, our algorithm
obtains a matching µi for the instance Ii. Since the single matching of stage 0, i.e., the
empty matching, is a POM in I0, the core idea is to modify µi−1 in such way that if µi−1
is a POM with respect to Ii−1 then µi is a POM with respect to Ii. To achieve this, the
algorithm relies on the following flow network.
Consider the digraph D = (V,E). Its node set is V = A∪T ∪C∪{σ, τ} where σ and τ
are the source and the sink and vertices in T correspond to the ties in the preference lists
of all applicants; i.e., T has a node (a, t) per applicant a and tie t such that Cat 6= ∅. Its arc
set is E = E1∪E2∪E3∪E4 where E1 = {(σ, a) : a ∈ A}, E2 = {(a, (a, t)) : a ∈ A,Cat 6= ∅},
E3 = {((a, t), c) : c ∈ Cat } and E4 = {(c, τ) : c ∈ C}. The graph D for the instance of
Table 1 appears in Figure 1, where an oval encircles all the vertices of T that correspond
to the same applicant, i.e., one vertice per tie.
Using digraph D = (V,E), we obtain a flow network N i at each stage i of the algorithm,
i.e., a network corresponding to instance Ii, by appropriately varying the capacities of the
arcs. (For an introduction on network flow algorithms see, e.g., [3].) The capacity of each
arc in E3 is always 1 (since each course may be received at most once by each applicant)
and the capacity of an arc e = (c, τ) ∈ E4 is always q(c). The capacities of all arcs in
E1 ∪ E2 are initially 0 and, at stage i, the capacities of only certain arcs associated with
applicant ai are increased by 1. For this reason, for each applicant a we use the variable
curr(a) that indicates her ‘active’ tie; initially, curr(a) is set to 1 for all a ∈ A.
In stage i, the algorithm computes a maximum flow f i whose saturated arcs in E3
indicate the corresponding matching µi. The algorithm starts with f0 = 0 and µ0 = ∅.
Let the applicant ai ∈ A be a copy of applicant a considered in stage i. The algorithm
increases by 1 the capacity of arc (σ, a) ∈ E1 (i.e., the applicant is allowed to receive an
additional course). It then examines the tie curr(a) to check whether the additional course
can be received from tie curr(a). To do this, the capacity of arc (a, (a, curr(a))) ∈ E2
is increased by 1. The network in stage i where tie curr(ai) is examined is denoted by
N i,curr(a
i). If there is an augmenting σ − τ path in this network, the algorithm augments
the current flow f i−1 to obtain f i, accordingly augments µi−1 to obtain µi (i.e., it sets µi
to the symmetric difference of µi−1 and all pairs (a, c) for which there is an arc ((a, t), c) in
the augmenting path) and proceeds to the next stage. Otherwise, it decreases the capacity
of (a, (a, curr(a))) by 1 (but not the capacity of arc (σ, a)) and it increases curr(a) by 1
to examine the next tie of a; if all (non-empty) ties have been examined, the algorithm
proceeds to the next stage without augmenting the flow. Note that an augmenting σ − τ
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Figure 1: Digraph D for the instance I from Table 1.
path in the network N i,curr(a
i) corresponds to an augmenting path coalition in µi−1 with
respect to Ii.
A formal description of GSDT is provided by Algorithm 1, where w(e) denotes the
capacity of an arc e ∈ E and ⊕ denotes symmetric difference. Observe that all arcs in E2
are saturated, except for the arc corresponding to the current applicant and tie, thus any
augmenting path has one arc from each of E1, E2 and E4 and all other arcs from E3; as
a consequence, the number of courses each applicant receives at stage i in any tie cannot
decrease at any subsequent step. Also, µi dominates µi−1 with respect to instance Ii if
and only if there is a flow in N i that saturates all arcs in E2.
Algorithm 1: Producing a POM for any instance of ca
Input: an instance I of CA and a multisequence Σ
f0 := 0; µ0 := ∅;
for each a ∈ A, curr(a) := 1;
for i = 1, 2, . . . , B do
{
consider the applicant a = ai;
w(σ, a)++;
P := ∅;
while P = ∅ and curr(a) ≤ n2 and Cacurr(a) 6= ∅ do
{
w(a, (a, curr(a)))++;
P := augmenting path in N i,curr(a) with respect to f i−1;
if P = ∅ then { w(a, (a, curr(a)))- -; curr(a)++};
}
if P 6= ∅ then { f i := f i−1 ⊕P;
µi := µi−1 ⊕ {(a, c) : ((a, t), c) ∈ P for some tie t}; }
otherwise { f i := f i−1; µi := µi−1; }
}
return µB;
To prove the correctness of GSDT, we need two intermediate lemmas. Let et ∈ Rn2
be the vector having 1 at entry t and 0 elsewhere.
Lemma 5. Let N i,t be the network at stage i while tie t of applicant ai is examined. Then,
there is an augmenting path with respect to f i−1 in N i,t if and only if there is a matching
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µ such that
χa(µ(a)) = χa(µ
i−1(a)) for each a 6= ai and χai(µ(ai)) = χai(µi−1(ai)) + et.
Proof. Note that the flows f i−1 and f i, corresponding to µi−1 and µi respectively, are
feasible in N i. Moreover, f i−1 is feasible in N i,t and, if there is an augmenting path with
respect to f i−1 in N i,t, then f i is feasible in N i,t too.
If there is a path augmenting f i−1 by 1 in N i,t thus obtaining f i, the number of courses
assigned per tie and applicant remain identical except for ai that receives an extra course
from tie t. Thus, χa(µ(a)) is identical to χa(µ
i−1(a)) for all a ∈ A except for ai whose
characteristic vector has its t’th entry increased by 1.
Conversely, if the above equation holds, flow f i is larger than f i−1 in the network N i,t.
Thus standard network flow theory implies the existence of a path augmenting f i−1. As
a side remark, since the network N i,t has similar arc capacities with the N i−1 except for
the arcs (σ, ai) and (ai, (ai, t)), this augmenting path includes these two arcs.
Lemma 6. Let S a U and |S| ≥ |U |. If cS and cU denote a least preferred course of
applicant a in S and U , respectively, then S\{cS} a U\{cU}.
Proof. For convenience, we denote S\{cS} by S′ and U\{cU} by U ′. Let
χa(S) = (s1, s2, . . . , sn2), χa(U) = (u1, u2, . . . , un2)
and
χa(S
′) = (s′1, s
′
2, . . . , s
′
n2), χa(U
′) = (u′1, u
′
2, . . . , u
′
n2).
If S 'a U , then cS 'a cU and χa(S) = χa(U), therefore χa(S′) = χa(U ′) and S′ 'a U ′.
Otherwise, S a U implies that there is k ∈ [n2] such that sj = uj for each j < k and
sk > uk.
If there is j ≥ k + 1 with sj > 0, then cS ∈ Car with r ≥ k + 1. It follows that
s′k = sk > uk ≥ u′k while s′j ≥ u′j for all j < k, thus χa(S′) >lex χa(U ′), i.e., S′ a U ′.
The same follows if sk ≥ uk + 2 because then s′k ≥ sk − 1 > uk ≥ u′k.
It remains to examine the case where sj = 0 for all j ≥ k + 1 and sk = uk + 1. In
this case, cS ∈ Cak thus s′k = sk − 1 = uk, while |S| ≥ |U | implies that either uj = 0 for
all j ≥ k + 1 or there is a single k′ > k such that uk′ = 1. In the former case cU ∈ Car
for r ≤ k thus χa(S′) >lex χa(U ′), whereas in the latter one u′k = uk = sk − 1 = s′k and
s′j = u
′
j = 0 for all j > k hence χa(S
′) = χa(U ′).
Theorem 7. For each i, the matching µi obtained by GSDT is a POM for instance Ii.
Proof. We apply induction on i. Clearly, µ0 = ∅ is the single matching in I0 and hence a
POM in I0. We assume that µi−1 is a POM in Ii−1 and prove that µi is a POM in Ii.
Assume to the contrary that µi is not a POM in Ii. This implies that there is a
matching ξ in Ii that dominates µi. Then, for all a ∈ A, ξ(a) a µi(a) a µi−1(a). Recall
that the capacities of all applicants in Ii are as in Ii−1 except for the capacity of ai that
has been increased by 1. Hence, for all a ∈ A \ {ai}, |ξ(a)| does not exceed the capacity
of a in instance Ii−1, namely bi−1(a), while |ξ(ai)| may exceed bi−1(ai) by at most 1.
Moreover, it holds that |ξ(ai)| ≥ |µi(ai)|. Assuming to the contrary that |ξ(ai)| <
|µi(ai)| yields that ξ is feasible also in instance Ii−1. In addition, |ξ(ai)| < |µi(ai)| implies
that it cannot be ξ(ai) 'ai µi(ai) thus, together with ξ(ai) ai µi(ai) ai µi−1(ai), it
yields ξ(ai) ai µi(ai) ai µi−1(ai). But then ξ dominates µi−1 in Ii−1, a contradiction
to µi−1 being a POM in Ii−1.
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Let us first examine the case in which GSDT enters the ‘while’ loop and finds an
augmenting path, hence µi dominates µi−1 in Ii only with respect to applicant ai that
receives an additional course. This is one of her worst courses in µi(ai) denoted as cµ. Let
cξ be a worst course for a
i in ξ(ai). Let also ξ′ and µ′ denote ξ\{(ai, cξ)} and µi\{(ai, cµ)},
respectively. Observe that both ξ′ and µ′ are feasible in Ii−1, while having shown that
|ξ(ai)| ≥ |µi(ai)| implies through Lemma 6 that ξ′ weakly dominates µ′ which in turn
weakly dominates µi−1 by Lemma 5. Since µi−1 is a POM in Ii−1, ξ′(a) 'a µ′(a) 'a
µi−1(a) for all a ∈ A, therefore ξ dominates µi only with respect to ai and cξ ai cµ.
Overall, ξ(a) 'a µi(a) 'a µi−1(a) for all a ∈ A \ {ai} and ξ(ai) ai µi(ai) ai µi−1(ai).
Let tξ and tµ be the ties of applicant a
i containing cξ and cµ, respectively, where tξ < tµ
because cξ ai cµ. Then, Lemma 5 implies that there is a path augmenting f i−1 (i.e.,
the flow corresponding to µi−1) in the network N i,tξ . Let also t′ be the value of curr(ai)
at the beginning of stage i. Since we examine the case where GSDT enters the ‘while’
loop and finds an augmenting path, Ca
i
t′ 6= ∅. Thus, t′ indexes the least preferred tie from
which ai has a course in µi−1. The same holds for ξ′ since ξ′(ai) 'ai µi−1(ai). Because
ξ′ is obtained by removing from ai its worst course in ξ(ai), that course must belong to a
tie of index no smaller than t′, i.e., t′ ≤ tξ. This together with tξ < tµ yield t′ ≤ tξ < tµ,
which implies that GSDT should have obtained ξ instead of µi at stage i, a contradiction.
It remains to examine the cases where, at stage i, GSDT does not enter the ‘while’
loop or enters it but finds no augmenting path. For both these cases, µi = µi−1, thus
ξ dominating µi means that ξ is not feasible in Ii−1 (since it would then also dominate
µi−1). Then, it holds that |ξ(ai)| exceeds bi−1(ai) by 1, thus |ξ(ai)| > |µi(ai)| yielding
ξ(ai) ai µi(ai). Let tξ be defined as above and t′ now be the most preferred tie from
which ai has more courses in ξ than in µi. Clearly, t′ ≤ tξ since tξ indexes the least
preferred tie from which ai has a course in ξ. If t′ < tξ, then the matching ξ′, defined as
above, is feasible in Ii−1 and dominates µi−1 because ξ′(ai) ai µi−1(ai), a contradiction;
the same holds if t′ = tξ and ai has in ξ at least two more courses from tξ than in µi.
Otherwise, t′ = tξ and ai has in ξ exactly one more course from tξ than in µi; that,
together with |ξ(ai)| > |µi(ai)| and the definition of tξ, implies that the index of the least
preferred tie from which ai has a course in µi−1 and, therefore, the value of curr(ai) in
the beginning of stage i, is at most t′. But then GSDT should have obtained ξ instead of
µi at stage i, a contradiction.
The following statement is now direct.
Corollary 8. GSDT produces a POM for instance I.
To derive the complexity bound for GSDT, let us denote by L the length of the pref-
erence profile in I, i.e., the total number of courses in the preference lists of all applicants.
Notice that |E3| = L and neither the size of any matching in I nor the total number of
ties in all preference lists exceeds L.
Within one stage, several searches in the network might be needed to find a tie of
the active applicant for which the current flow can be augmented. However, one tie is
unsuccessfully explored at most once, hence each search either augments the flow thus
adding a pair to the current matching or moves to the next tie. So the total number of
searches performed by the algorithm is bounded by the size of the obtained matching plus
the number of ties in the preference profile, i.e., it is O(L). A search requires a number of
steps that remains linear in the number of arcs in the current network (i.e., N i,curr(a
i)),
but as at most one arc per E1, E2 and E4 is used, any search needs O(|E3|) = O(L) steps.
This leads to a complexity bound O(L2) for GSDT.
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The next theorem will come in handy when implementing Algorithm 1, as it implies
that for each applicant a only one node in T corresponding to a has to be maintained at
a time.
Theorem 9. Let N i,t be the network at stage i while tie t of applicant ai is examined.
Then, there is no augmenting path with respect to f i−1 in N i,t that has an arc of the form
((aj , `), c) where j ≤ i and ` < curr(aj).
Proof. Assume otherwise. Let P be such an augmenting path that is found in round i
and used to obtain µi. Hence P corresponds to an augmenting path coalition C of the
following form 〈ai, cr, . . . , cs, aj , cq, . . .〉 where cr is in the t’th indifference class of ai and
both cs and cq are in the `’th indifference class of a
j , ` < curr(aj). Note that as ` ≥ 1
thus curr(aj) > 1. It then follows from the description of Algorithm 1 that either aj is
matched to at least one course in curr(aj) under µi or she is exposed (which would be the
case when curr(aj) > n2 or C
aj
curr(aj)
= ∅).
We first show that ai and aj are not the same applicant. Otherwise, C′ = 〈aj , cq, . . .〉—
obtained from C by discarding all courses and applicants that appear before aj—is an
augmenting path coalition w.r.t. µi−1 in Ii. Clearly the matching obtained from µi−1 by
satisfying C′ Pareto dominates µi, as ` < t, contradicting that µi is a POM in Ii.
In the remainder of the proof we assume that ai 6= aj . Let us first consider the case
where aj is matched to a course in Ca
j
curr(aj)
under µi, and therefore by Lemma 5 to a
course c ∈ Caj
curr(aj)
under µi−1. Let C′ = 〈c, aj , cq, . . . 〉, i.e., C′ is obtained from C by
discarding all courses and applicants that appear before aj and replacing them with c.
Since ` < curr(aj), we have cqajc. It is then easy to see that C′ is an alternating path
coalition w.r.t. µi−1 in Ii−1, and hence µi−1 is not a POM in Ii−1, a contradiction. We
now consider the case where aj is exposed in µi, and hence exposed in µi−1 w.r.t. Ii−1.
Let C′ = 〈aj , cq, . . . 〉, i.e., C′ is obtained from C by discarding all courses and applicants
that appear before aj . It is clear that C′ is an augmenting path coalition w.r.t. µi−1 in
Ii−1, contradicting that µ′ is a POM in Ii−1.
Next we show that GSDT can produce any POM. Our proof makes use of a subgraph
of the extended envy graph of Definition 1.
Theorem 10. Given a CA instance I and a POM µ, there exists a suitable priority
ordering over applicants Σ given which GSDT can produce µ.
Proof. Given an instance I and a POM µ, let G = (V,E) be a digraph such that V =
{ac : (a, c) ∈ µ} and there is an arc from ac to a′c′ if a 6= a′, c′ /∈ µ(a) and c′ a c. An arc
(ac, a′c′) has weight −1 if a prefers c′ to c and has weight 0 if she is indifferent between
the two courses. Note that G is a subgraph of the extended envy graph G(µ) introduced
in Definition 1. We say that ac envies a′c′ if (ac, a′c′) has weight −1.
Note that if there exists an applicant-course pair ac ∈ µ and a course c′ such that c′ac
and ac′ /∈ µ, then c′ must be full under µ, or else µ admits an alternating path coalition
and is not a POM.
Moreover, all arcs in any given strongly connected component (SCC) of G have weight
0. To see this, note that by the definition of a SCC, there is a path from any node to
every other node in the component. Hence, if there is an arc in a SCC with weight −1,
then there must be a cycle of negative weight in that SCC. It is then straightforward to
see that, by Lemma 1, µ admits a cyclic coalition, a contradiction.
It then follows that if c′ac, then ac′ and ac cannot belong to the same SCC. Should
that occur, there would be an arc (of weight 0) from ac′ to some vertex a′c∗ in the same
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SCC, implying that c∗ 'a c′ and thus c∗ac. This in turn would yield that there is an arc
of weight −1 from ac to a′c∗ in this SCC, a contradiction.
We create the condensation G′ of the graph G. It follows from the definition of SCCs
that G′ is a DAG. Hence G′ admits a topological ordering. Let X ′ be a reversed topological
ordering of G′ and X be an ordering of the vertices in G that is consistent with X ′ (the
vertices within one SCC may be ordered arbitrarily). Let Σ be an ordering over applicant
copies that is consistent with X (we can think of it as obtained from X by removing the
courses). We show that GSDT can produce µ given Σ. Note that technically Σ must
contain b(a) copies of each applicant a. However, as µ is Pareto optimal, upon obtaining
µ the algorithm will not be able to allocate any more courses to any of the applicants,
even if we append more applicant copies to the end of Σ.
We continue the proof with an induction. Recall thatX is an ordering over the matched
pairs in µ. We let X(ai) = c where aic is the ith element of X. Let µi denote the matching
that corresponds to the first i elements of X; hence µ|µ| = µ. We claim that given Σ,
GSDT is able to produce µi at stage i, after augmenting f i−1 through an appropriate
augmenting path.
For the base case, note that a1X(a1) does not envy any other vertex in G and hence it
can only be that X(a1) ∈ C1a1 . It is then easy to see that the path 〈σ, a1, (a1, 1), X(a1), τ〉
is a valid augmenting path in N1,1 and hence GSDT might choose it.
Assume that GSDT produces µ` at the end of each stage ` for all ` < i. We prove that
it can produce µi at the end of stage i. Assume, for a contradiction, that this is not the
case. Let r denote the indifference class of ai to which X(ai) belongs. Note that course
X(ai) is not full in Ii, so if the path 〈σ, ai, (ai, r), X(ai), τ〉 is not chosen by GSDT, it must
be the case that GSDT finds an augmenting path in N i,t for some t < r. Let C denote the
corresponding augmenting path coalition with respect to the matching µi−1, which would
be of the form
ai, cj1 , a
i1 , . . . , ciy−1 , a
iy−1 , cjy
where cj1 ∈ Ctai and cjy is exposed in µi−1. It follows, from the definition of an augmenting
path, that there is an edge (aikcjk , a
ik+1cjk+1) in G for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ y − 2. Furthermore,
as cj1aiµ(ai), there is an edge of weight −1 in G from aiX(ai) to ai1cj1 ; therefore ai1cj1
belongs to a SCC of higher priority than the one to which aiX(ai) belongs. If cjy is exposed
in µ, then C′ that is obtained by adding X(ai) to the beginning of C is an alternating path
coalition in µ, a contradiction to µ being a POM. Therefore cjy must be full in µ.
As cjy is not full in µ
i−1 and full in µ, there must exist an az, z > i, such that
(az, cjy) ∈ µ. It follows, from the augmenting path coalition C, that there is a path in
G from ai1cj1 to a
zcjy . If there is also a path from a
zcjy to a
i1cj1 , then the two vertices
belong to the same SCC; as ai1cj1 belongs to a SCC of higher priority than the one to
which aiX(ai) belongs, so must azcjy , implying that a
zcjy must have appeared before
aiX(ai) in X, a contradiction to z > i. If there is no such a path, then azcjy belongs to a
SCC that is prioritized even over the SCC to which ai1cj1 belongs, and hence must have
appeared before aiX(ai) in X, a contradiction to z > i.
5 Truthfulness of mechanisms for finding POMs
It is well-known that the SDM for HA is truthful, regardless of the given priority ordering
over applicants. We will show shortly that GSDT is not necessarily truthful, but first
prove that this property does hold for some priority orderings over applicants.
Theorem 11. GSDT is truthful given Σ if, for each applicant a, all occurrences of a in
Σ are consecutive.
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a1 : c1  c2
a2 : c1  c2
I1 with µ1
a1 : c1  c2
a2 : c1
I2 with µ2
a1 : c2  c1
a2 : c1
I3 with µ2
a1 : c2  c1
a2 : c1  c2
I4
Figure 2: Four instances of CA used in the proof of Theorem 14. In all four instances
b(a1) = 2, b(a2) = 1, q(c1) = q(c2) = 1. For each of instances I1 to I3, a matching is
indicated using circles in applicants’ preference lists.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let the applicants appear in Σ in the following order:
a1, a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(a1)-times
, a2, a2, . . . , a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(a2)-times
. . . , ai−1, ai−1, . . . , ai−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(ai−1)-times
, ai, ai, . . . , ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(ai)-times
, . . .
Assume to the contrary that some applicant benefits from misrepresenting her preferences.
Let ai be the first such applicant in Σ who reports P
′(ai) instead of P (ai) in order to benefit
and P ′ = (P ′(ai),P(−ai)). Let µ denote the matching returned by GSDT using ordering
Σ on instance I = (A,C,P, b, q) (i.e. the instance in which applicant ai reports truthfully)
and ξ the matching returned by GSDT using Σ but on instance I ′ = (A,C,P ′, b, q). Let
s = (Σ`<ib(a`)) + 1, i.e., s is the first stage in which our mechanism considers applicant
ai. Let j be the first stage of GSDT such that ai prefers ξ
j to µj , where s ≤ j < s+ b(ai).
Given that applicants a1, . . . , ai−1 report the same in I as in I ′ and all their occurrences
in Σ are before stage j, Lemma 5 yields µj(a`) 'a` ξj(a`) for ` = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1. Also
µj(a`) = ξ
j(a`) = ∅ for ` = i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n1, since no such applicant has been considered
before stage j. But then, all applicants apart from ai are indifferent between µ
j and ξj ,
therefore ai preferring ξ
j to µj implies that µj is not a POM in Ij , a contradiction to
Theorem 7.
The next result then follows directly from Theorem 11.
Corollary 12. GSDT is truthful if all applicants have quota equal to one.
There are priority orderings for which an applicant may benefit from misreporting her
preferences, even if preferences are strict. This phenomenon has also been observed in a
slightly different context [6]. Let us also provide an example.
Example 13. Consider a setting with applicants a1 and a2 and courses c1 and c2, for
which b(a1) = 2, b(a2) = 1, q(c1) = 1, and q(c2) = 1. Let I be an instance in which
c2a1c1 and a2 finds only c1 acceptable. This setting admits two POMs, namely µ1 =
{(a1, c2), (a2, c1)} and µ2 = {(a1, c1), (a1, c2)}. GSDT returns µ1 for Σ = (a1, a2, a1). If
a1 misreports by stating that she prefers c1 to c2, GSDT returns µ2 instead of µ1. Since
µ2a1µ1, GSDT is not truthful given Σ.
The above observation seems to be a deficiency of GSDT. We conclude by showing
that no mechanism capable of producing all POMs is immune to this shortcoming.
Theorem 14. There is no universally truthful randomized mechanism that produces all
POMs in CA, even if applicants’ preferences are strict and all courses have quota equal to
one.
Proof. The instance I1 in Figure 2 admits three POMs, namely µ1 = {(a1, c1),
(a2, c2)}, µ2 = {(a1, c1), (a1, c2)} and µ3 = {(a1, c2), (a2, c1)}. Assume a randomized
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mechanism φ that produces all these matchings. Therefore, there must be a deterministic
realization of it, denoted as φD, that returns µ1 given I1. Let us examine the outcome of
φD under the slightly different applicants’ preferences shown in Figure 2, bearing in mind
that φD is truthful.
• Under I2, φD must return µ2. The only other POM under I2 is µ3, but if φD returns
µ3, then a2 under I1 has an incentive to lie and declare only c1 acceptable (as in I2).
• Under I3, φD must return µ2. The only other POM under I3 is µ3, but if φD returns
µ3, then a1 under I3 has an incentive to lie and declare that she prefers c1 to c2 (as
in I2).
I4 admits two POMs, namely µ2 and µ3. If φ
D returns µ2, then a1 under I1 has an
incentive to lie and declare that she prefers c2 to c1 (as in I4). If φ
D returns µ3, then
a2 under I3 has an incentive to lie and declare c2 acceptable—in addition to c1—and
less preferred than c1 (as in I4). Thus overall φ
D cannot return a POM under I4 while
maintaining truthfulness.
6 Future work
Our work raises several questions. A particularly important problem is to investigate the
expected size of the matching produced by the randomized version of GSDT. It is also
interesting to characterize priority orderings that imply truthfulness in GSDT. Conse-
quently, it will be interesting to compute the expected size of the matching produced by
a randomized GSDT in which the randomization is taken over the priority orderings that
induce truthfulness.
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